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Executive Summary 
 
When reforming their network utility industries, many developing countries give the 
newly-privatized incumbent exclusive rights to serve a particular market.  These “exclusivity 
periods” are especially common in telecommunications.  Research to date has explored the 
effects of privatization, competition, and to a lesser extent, regulation.  We know very little, 
however, about the effects of the details of privatization transactions themselves and, in 
particular, how exclusivity periods matter.  I use an original, new dataset to explore the costs and 
benefits of this approach to privatization.  I find that exclusivity periods are associated with 
significant increases in the firm’s sale price.  The increased revenues to the government come 
with a cost, however.  Exclusivity periods are correlated with a significant decrease in the 
incumbent’s investment in the telecommunications network, payphones, mobile telephone 
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Privatizing Monopolies in Developing Countries: 
The Real Effects of Exclusivity Periods in Telecommunications 
 
Scott J. Wallsten 
 
1. Introduction 
  Countries around the world—and especially developing and transition countries—
undertook massive privatization campaigns over the last two decades of the 20
th Century.  By the 
year 2000 worldwide privatization revenues had topped $1 trillion.  A relatively large body of 
research on privatization suggests that, overall, it has led to large improvements in the privatized 
firms’ efficiency and performance (see, e.g., Megginson and Netter 2001, Shirley and Walsh 
2000 for comprehensive overviews of this literature).  Most of this research has focused on the 
outcomes of privatization by comparing performance before and after the privatization, across 
countries with different market structures, or both (panel data). 
  Existing studies, however, have largely ignored how the details of the privatization 
transaction itself matter.  When markets are contestable and competitive entry is fairly easy the 
details of how the firm is privatized may not have many implications for the market as a whole.  
The biggest privatizations, however, both in terms of magnitude and complexity have been in 
network utilities, such as telecommunications, electricity, and water.  In industries like these 
where the monopoly incumbent has a great deal of market power, the rules of the privatization 
can largely determine the resulting market structure, and thus outcomes.  That is, the investor is 
not simply buying a firm’s assets, but also the right to operate in a particular way in a particular 
market.  The details of the privatization often implicitly define the market that the investors are 
bidding to serve.  One of the most common features of privatizations in these industries that 
helps define the market is a multi-year exclusivity period.  Under such an agreement the 
government allows the newly-privatized firm to operate as a monopoly for some number of 
years.  Such arrangements are generally defended as necessary to attract investors and 
investment, even if they delay competition. 
Largely because data are scarce, to date no empirical studies have attempted to 
systematically estimate the effects of these exclusivity periods.  The gap in our knowledge is 
unfortunate given both the magnitude of the transactions and the fact that that the rules of the 
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privatization can potentially have large impacts on how the market develops and thus on the 
success of the reforms. 
In this paper I use an original, new dataset to explore the real effects of exclusivity 
periods in telecommunications privatizations.  The Infrastructure Privatization Database is 
jointly sponsored by The World Bank and Stanford University to analyze the impact of 
regulatory institutions and privatization policies on utility performance.  I complement this 
database with information from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and World 
Bank Development Indicators.  Using this combination of firm- and country-level cross-section 
and panel data, I estimate the effect of exclusivity periods on firms’ sale prices and also on the 
development of the telecommunications sector.  The analysis reveals that exclusivity periods 




The recent trend towards competition in telecommunications is best described as a return 
to competition, rather than as an entirely new phenomenon.  Telecom markets around the world 
in the nineteenth century were highly competitive (Petrazzini 1996, Wallsten 2003).   
Nonetheless, telecom soon came to be viewed as a natural monopoly—that it could be provided 
at the lowest cost by one firm.  Most developing countries nationalized their telecom providers in 
the 1960s, with disastrous consequences for service.  Saunders, et al (1983) note that by 1981 
Africa and Latin America averaged only 0.8 and 5.5 telephones per hundred people, respectively, 
compared to 83.7 in the United States. 
In the 1980s, the nationalization trend began to reverse itself.  Though the specifics differ 
by country and region, in large part three common factors drove reforms around the world.  First, 
the exceptionally poor performance of state-owned telecom firms generated pressure for reforms.  
Long waiting periods for telephone connections and the unreliability of those connections 
generated popular demand, while inefficient operations often requiring large state subsidies 
encouraged governments to divest firms that were draining national treasuries.  Second, 
international lending organizations began pressuring countries to divest.  Wellenius (1992) notes 
that in the 1960s the World Bank funded primarily infrastructure investments, in the 1970s 
organization and management reforms, but by the 1980s focused on sectoral reforms, including 
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privatization.  Using panel data on 167 countries from 1980 through 1998, Li, Qiang, and Xu 
(2001) find empirical evidence that telecom reforms were brought about both in response to poor 
sector performance and foreign aid, including the presence of World Bank telecommunications 
loans.  Finally, there was a general worldwide trend towards divestiture, started largely by 
Britain’s Thatcher government in 1979, which coined the term “privatization” (Megginson and 
Netter 2001). 
  The pace of telecommunications reforms accelerated dramatically in the 1990s.  By the 
end of 1999 the International Telecommunications Union reported that more than half of Asian 
and Latin American countries and one-third of African countries had privatized their 
telecommunications providers, and another eight African countries had immediate privatization 
plans (International Telecommunications Union 1999).
1 
Substantial evidence reveals that privatization can lead to performance improvements.  
Megginson, et al (1994) compare pre- and post-privatization financial and operating performance 
of 61 companies (in 32 industries, including telecommunications) in 18 countries.  They find 
increased sales, profits, investments, and employment following privatization.  Early case studies 
and empirical work compared average performance indicators across firms or countries before 
and after reforms took effect.  Not surprisingly, given the region’s relatively early start in 
reforms, most of that evidence was from Latin America.  In general, these studies found positive 
effects of reforms (e.g., Kikeri, et al. 1992, Wellenius 1992).  
Though privatization has yielded significant benefits, allowing entry and competition into 
the sector appears to bring far greater benefits.  A monopoly provider, whether state-owned or 
private, faces fewer incentives to improve service and lower prices than do firms operating in a 
competitive environment.  As Ambrose, et al (1990) note, “simply moving a monopoly from the 
public to the private sphere will not result in competitive behavior.”  More recent empirical work 
has been able to work with panel data as enough time has elapsed to make econometric analysis 
more useful.  Across the board this research finds that competition drives the biggest 
improvements in the sector (Fink, et al. 2002, Li and Xu 2001, Petrazzini 1996, Ros 1999, 
Wallsten 2001a). 
Most competition has come in the form of mobile telephony.  Because the fixed line 
network was in horrific condition in many countries, and the fixed costs of building out a 
                                                 
1   The ITU also noted that no Arab states had privatized their telecommunications providers. 
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wireless network relatively low, new entrants were able to build wireless networks and attract 
large numbers of customers relatively quickly.  Indeed, it is not much of a stretch to claim that 
the true mobile revolution occurred in developing countries—not by providing wireless internet 
or data services, but simply by providing a viable competitor to the fixed line incumbent.  In 
many cases, the incumbent had already lost a substantial degree of market power by the time it 
realized that mobile telephones were true competitors. 
 
Conflicting objectives 
Despite the obvious and proven benefits of competition, the reform process has often not 
been friendly to its introduction.  At the end of the 20
th century, only somewhat more than half of 
all countries allowed competition in mobile services, and less than 30 percent allow competition 
in basic services (International Telecommunications Union 1999).  The reason for this hostility is 
a combination of the need to balance conflicting objectives, political constraints, and biased 
advice.  
It is an understatement to say that telecom reforms are complicated.  State-owned 
enterprises confront inconsistent objectives and competing constituencies (The World Bank 
1995), and the privatization process itself is not insulated from those problems.  Wellenius 
(1997) notes that 
The primary purpose of reform is to get consumers more, better, new, and less costly services.  
Pressures from interest groups—incumbents who want ongoing protection, new entrants 
seeking special deals, treasury officials expecting to use sales revenues to reduce budget 
deficits, financial advisers earning success fees tied to transaction prices—can steer reform off 
track.  In particular, sales strategies that drive up prices paid for existing companies or new 
licenses can hold down growth, reduce the funding available to invest in those companies, or 
result in high tariffs. 
 
One important conflict arises between the government’s desires to maximize revenues to 
the treasury from the privatization and to improve telecom service.
2  The problem is that 
especially in the case of the telecom sector, where most nations have a monopoly provider, the 
easiest—and certainly the most common—method of increasing the firm’s value to private 
investors is to give the incumbent firm monopoly rights.  Unfortunately, as discussed above, 
precluding competition is likely to retard improvements in the telecom sector. 
                                                 
2   Though Megginson (2001) notes that there is progress towards both goals.  Privatizations (across the globe for all 
privatized industries, not just telecommunications) have raised over $1 trillion through 1999, while substantial 
evidence suggests that privatized firms exhibit improved operating and financial performance. 
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The government may face substantial pressure to maximize revenues.  The first metric by 
which the success of the sale is likely to be judged is the sale price.  Privatizations tend to be 
controversial, and the government may be wary of being accused of “giving away the crown 
jewels.”  This wariness and a need to build support for privatization may create an incentive to 
generate a high sales price, even at the expense of delaying future improvements in the network.  
These pressures may have been especially intense during the first privatizations, when there was 
little evidence that privatizations could be successful or that failing state-owned firms could 
attract private investors. 
Sometimes governments may face outside pressure to maximize the sales price.   
Consultants advising countries on how to structure privatization deals face their own incentives, 
which may be towards maximizing revenue rather than subsequent investment in the network.  
Senegal, for example, enlisted the help of a French bank, Crédit Commercial de France (CCF), to 
aid its privatization of Sonatel.  For its services CCF was paid a fixed fee plus a percentage of 
Sonatel’s sale price (Azam, et al. 2002).  Such an arrangement clearly provided CCF with an 
incentive to encourage the government to maximize the sales price and to put less weight on how 
the sector was likely to improve after the transaction.
3  
While maximizing sales price is typically the primary reason for granting exclusivity 
periods, some advance other rationale.  First, some privatization advisers believe that the 
incumbent must be given an exclusivity period in order to stimulate investment.  One consultant 
writes that 
The effectiveness of restrictions on competition during the exclusivity period assures the 
economic viability of that period.  The privatized company relies upon an exclusivity 
period during which the competitive boundaries are strong enough to control competitive 
entry so that the operator may direct and concentrate its capital and human and technical 
resources on expanding and modernizing the network.   Successful infrastructure 
expansion and modernization to ensure broad coverage of service mutually benefits the 
operator and the customer base. (Barbour 1997) 
 
This argument is unlikely to be correct.  While such advice is certain to boost the 
treasury’s revenues and the transaction advisor’s fee, restricting competition is probably not 
likely to stimulate investment.  As Noll (2000) notes, firms operating in a competitive 
environment and monopolists both face the same cost of capital, and neither will invest unless 
                                                 
3   Indeed, Sonatel was given a seven-year exclusivity arrangement when it was privatized.  It should be noted that it 
is unclear whether CCF influenced this decision. 
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the expected revenues make the investment worthwhile.  The monopolist’s market power makes 
it less, not more, likely to undertake a given investment, since monopoly profits are typically 
obtained by providing lower quantities of the good or service at higher prices.  A firm with a 
guaranteed monopoly is also likely to invest less since it does not have to worry about more 
efficient competitors stealing market share.  Even the threat of entry—which is typically the 
situation when reforms are introduced—can be enough to induce the incumbent to invest.
4  
Second, while decidedly an increasingly less-accepted view, some still believe that local 
telecom service is a natural monopoly, providing ammunition for those who wish to give 
exclusive concessions.  But this belief contradicts our current understanding of 
telecommunications.  The notion that telecom was a natural monopoly began to appear less 
tenable as early as 1959, when the U.S. Federal Communications Commission decided to allow 
large firms to use microwave transmission to bypass the telephone network (Crandall and 
Waverman 1995).  Continuous improvements in technology make it increasingly unlikely that 
telecom is a natural monopoly (Noll 2000, Spiller and Cardilli 1997).  Advances in wireless 
technology alone allow competing firms to roll out telecommunications services with relatively 
low sunk costs—an attractive option in many developing countries. 
  Ultimately, the real effect of these exclusivity periods is an empirical question.  To my 
knowledge, only one paper has taken an empirical look at the effect of exclusivity periods. 
D’Souza and Megginson (1999) find exclusivity periods correlated with capital expenditures in a 
cross-sectional sample of ten firms.  While the paper is the first to begin to explore transaction 
details, the analysis does not control for important factors such as national income or population.  
Such controls are especially important given that their small sample includes both very wealthy 
and very poor countries.
5  In addition, Wellenius (1997) noted that Chile, which did not grant an 
exclusivity period, saw faster network growth than Argentina, Mexico, or Venezuela, which did 
                                                 
4   Incumbents typically are typically reluctant to give up their monopoly rents.  Interconnection issues are almost 
always the most contentious issue in both industrialized and developing countries.  Nobody will contract with a 
competing firm if it cannot to connect to the existing network.  The incumbent has no incentive on its own to allow 
interconnection or to set interconnection prices at their true cost, leading to a great deal of debate as to how to 
enforce interconnection rules and set prices. 
5  For example a study of 79 firms (in several industries) in 21 developing countries found significant productivity 
improvements after privatization Narjess Boubraki and Jean-Claude Cosset, "The Financial and Operating 
Peformance of Newly Privatized Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries," Journal of Finance 53, no. 3 
(1998)..  But they also note that privatization appears most successful in wealthier countries.  This observation 
highlights the need for controlling for important factors such as income.  While it may be the case that privatization 
is most successful in wealthier countries, it may also be the case that firms in general in wealthier countries 
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grant exclusivity periods to newly-privatized firms.  While this observation adds support to the 
hypothesis that exclusivity periods come with costs, it also does not control for other factors that 
may affect network growth and contains only one observation that did not grant an exclusivity 
period. 
  In this paper I attempt to quantify econometrically the effects of exclusivity periods by 
measuring their effects of the firms’ sale prices and on sector performance in countries that 
privatized their telecom providers.  In essence, this paper is a cost-benefit analysis in that it 
attempts to quantify the tradeoff between sale price and network performance.  In the following 
sections I discuss the data, methods, and results. 
 
3. Data 
Much of the data I use is part of the Infrastructure Privatization Database, sponsored 
jointly by The World Bank and Stanford University.  This ambitious project aims to fill the large 
empirical holes in our understanding of telecommunications reforms in developing countries.  In 
particular, the project is compiling and quantifying detailed regulatory, firm, and transaction 
information from many sources.  Regulatory data is derived from reform legislation and 
documents published by regulatory agencies.  Firm-level financial and operating performance 
information comes from the firms’ annual reports and prospectuses.  Details on the privatization 
transaction come from annual reports, investor prospectuses, and detailed case studies of 
privatizations.  Although this database is still a work-in-progress, enough information has been 
collected to begin to allow some new analyses.  In addition to information from this database, I 
add country-level data from the International Telecommunications Union and macroeconomic 
data from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
This paper explores the effects of exclusivity periods on firm sales price and sector 
performance.  Though this dataset has more complete information on reforms than any other, 
consistent data remain spotty.  I have consistent information on the privatization transaction for 
32 telecom firms in 28 countries.  Those data are cross-sectional.  I have panel data on 
exclusivity and performance indicators for 29 countries.  These samples are small and 
nonrandom, with selection based largely on the existence of data.  In addition, because we are 
interested in the effects of the details of the transaction itself, I include only firms that were 
                                                                                                                                                             
experienced improved productivity during the few years studied. 
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privatized.  The analysis, therefore, does not tell us anything about the effects of privatization, 
per se, since there is no shortage of research on that issue, but instead allows us to compare firms 
that were privatized under different conditions.  Table 1 lists the firms, the year they were 
privatized, the length of the exclusivity period, share sold, price, and the number of mainlines. 
The first firm in this group to be privatized was the Jamaican Telephone Company, in 
1987, while the most recent privatizations—in El Salvador and Brazil—took place in 1998.  The 
table shows a great deal of variation in transaction details.  First, exclusivity periods range from 
25 years for local, fixed service granted to the Jamaica Telephone Company to none in Chile, 
Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Brazil.  The share of the firm sold to private investors 
differs a great deal, as well.  The Brazilian government sold its entire stake in its telecom firms, 
while the Mexican government initially sold only 20.4 percent.  Pakistan stands out by simply 
selling shares of Pakistan Telephone and Telegraph to the public (twelve percent of the 
company) and not offering concessions to private firms.  Brazil and Argentina are noteworthy in 
having split their telecom firms into several separate companies before selling them.  Argentina 
created two firms—one to operate in the north (Telecom), and another to operate in the south 
(Telefonica).  They share ownership of the long distance provider.  Brazil split its 
telecommunications provider geographically into three companies plus an international long 
distance provider. 
I derive the value of the firm from the share of the firm sold and the price investors paid 
for that share.  Because privatizations occur over the course of more than a decade, deflating 
those values is important for any cross-sectional comparison.  Choosing the proper deflator is 
never an easy task, and it becomes more difficult in this cross-country sample.  I chose to use the 
United States capital expenditures deflator since purchasing a telecom firm is essentially a 
capital investment.  As it turns out, the choice of deflator affects only the magnitude of the 
empirical results but not the conclusions.
6 
 
4. Empirical Tests 
The analysis contains two primary components.  First, to explore the effects of 
exclusivity on the sale price of the firm I estimate a cross-sectional specification in which an 
observation is a firm in the year it was privatized.  Second, to explore the effects of exclusivity 
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on the telecom sector, I use country-level panel data to test the effects of exclusivity on 
investment.  Below I describe the test and results for each component in turn. 
 
Exclusivity and firm sales price 
Equation (1) details the general specification I use to test the effects of exclusivity on 
sales price. 
(1)  ln(implied firm valuei) = β0 + β1*(exclusivityi) + β2*ln(populationi) + β3*ln(gdp per 
capitai) + β4*ln(number mainlinesi)+ β5*ln(international settlement paymentsi) + εi 
 
I estimate several different versions of this equation, using different variable definitions to test 
the robustness of the results.  I first describe the general form and the reasons for including these 
particular exogenous variables, and then describe the specific variations of the equation. 
Implied firm value is the market value of the firm derived from the share of the firm sold 
and the price paid for that share.  Exclusivity indicates the exclusivity period granted to the firm.  
Because a monopoly is likely to be more profitable than a firm operating in a competitive 
environment, we would expect the coefficient on exclusivity to be positive.  Population and gdp 
per capita control for the size and potential profitability of the market.  The larger the population 
and per capita income, the more an investor may be willing to pay for the telecom firm.  The 
number of mainlines proxies for the actual plant and equipment the investor is purchasing. 
  International settlement payments are the net payments the country’s telephone company 
receives from United States-based carriers for international call from the U.S. that terminate in 
that country.  These payments result from bilaterally negotiated “accounting rates” between each 
country-pair in the world for international message telephone service.  Only the U.S., the U.K., 
and New Zealand make the rates and net payments public.  The FCC posts on its website current 
accounting rates, net payments to each country, and historical data.  These payments may be an 
important component of an investor’s willingness to pay since the payments can be quite large.  
Between 1985 and 1998 developing countries received nearly $35 billion in net settlement 
payments from U.S. carriers (Wallsten 2001b).  Mexico alone, for example, received more than 
$550 million in 1990, the year it was privatized—an amount large enough to be one of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
6   As it turns out, the empirical results are robust to any deflator choice, including no deflator. 
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factors potentially explaining investors’ willingness to pay nearly $1.8 billion for 20.4 percent of 
the company. 
Though these independent variables are straightforward enough, no single specification is 
inherently superior to others since there are many types of exclusivity and many ways one might 
determine the value of the investment.  I therefore use four different definitions of “exclusivity” 
and two different dependent variables, for a total of eight regressions.  I first define exclusivity as 
a dummy variable that equals one if the firm was granted any exclusivity period at all in any 
services (fixed local, domestic long distance, or international long distance).  The advantage of 
this dummy variable is that, while crude, it allows the largest sample size, since we have no more 
detailed exclusivity data for some firms. 
Second, I define exclusivity as a dummy variable that equals one if the firm received any 
exclusivity in international telecom services.  International exclusivity may be especially 
valuable to the investor.  While mobile firms can undermine exclusivity in local, fixed telephony, 
international exclusivity is harder to undermine since the owner of the international gateway can 
essentially completely control international telecommunications from the country. 
Those dummy variables, however, provide no information on the effects of the length of 
the exclusivity period.  To explore this question I define exclusivity as the log of the number of 
years of exclusivity.
7  Thus, the third definition is the log of the number of years of local fixed 
exclusivity, and the fourth definition is the log of the number of years of international 
exclusivity. 
  Finally, for each definition of exclusivity I estimate the equation twice using slightly 
different versions of the dependent variable.  I first define the dependent variable as the implied 
value of the telecom firm.  The implied value is the price paid by the investor divided by the 
share of the firm the investor purchased.  I then normalize the variable by dividing it by the 
number of mainlines to derive a value per line paid by the investor.  In this case I exclude the 
number of mainlines as an exogenous variable. 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (1).  Higher population increases the 
sales price of the telecom firm and value per line, which was expected given that a larger 
population means a larger potential market.  Per capita income is positively correlated with the 
firm value, though it is only weakly statistically significant, at best.  The number of mainlines is, 
                                                 
7   Since some countries granted no exclusivity, the actual definition is ln(exclusivity + 1). 
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surprisingly, negatively correlated with the implied value of the firm.  The insignificant results 
on per capita income and the negative coefficient on number of mainlines is likely due to the 
collinearity between those two variables.  It is well-known that the most important determinant 
of telephone penetration is per capita income, so including both variables in the equation makes 
it difficult to separately identify them.  The coefficient on international settlement payments is 
positive and significant in the per-line regressions, and positive but not statistically significant in 
the total value regressions. 
The coefficients of interest, those on the exclusivity variables, are uniformly positive and, 
with one exception, statistically significant.  In other words, the estimation reveals that investors 
were willing to pay substantially more for firms with monopoly concessions.  Granting any 
exclusivity is associated with more than doubling the price investors pay for the firm, ceteris 
peribus.  A monopoly in international long distance services appear to be even more valuable 
than a local monopoly.  It is clear why an exclusivity period is so appealing to governments 
looking to raise revenue and to transaction advisors, whose compensation may depend on the 
sale price. 
  Each additional year of exclusivity appears to be valuable, as well.  A one percent 
increase in the length of the local exclusivity period and international exclusivity period are 
associated with a 0.35 percent and 0.52 percent increase, respectively in the price per line an 
investor is willing to pay.  The coefficient on the log of the number of years of fixed local 
exclusivity is not statistically significantly correlated with total implied firm value, though the 
log of the number of years of international exclusivity is significantly correlated with an increase 
in firm value. 
   
Exclusivity and telecom investment 
  The second part of the analysis explores the effect of exclusivity on growth of the 
telecom network in the country.  This analysis differs from that described above in that the 
dataset becomes a country-level panel in which the first year a country appears is the year its 
telecom provider was privatized.  Again, as I noted above, this method of sample selection 
means that the analysis does not tell us anything about privatization, per se, only the difference 
between countries that privatized with and without granting exclusivity periods. 
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  To explore the effect of exclusivity periods on growth of the network, I estimate several 
versions of equation (2). 
(2)   ln(telecom investmentit) = β0 + β1*(exclusivityit) + β2*ln(populationit) + β3*ln(gdp per 
capitait) +  αt + γi + εit 
 
I estimate the equation several times using different definitions of, and proxies for, investment, 
which I describe in more detail below.  And, as in the analysis above, I use several definitions of 
exclusivity, also described below.  Independent variables include population and per capita GDP, 
for reasons described above.  Finally, the panel nature of the data lets me control for country and 
year fixed effects. 
When only one firm in a country provided all telecommunications, country-level analyses 
of this sort were relatively straightforward.  Country-level data from the International 
Telecommunications Union provided a fairly good snapshot of telecommunications 
development.  Reforms have complicated such analyses.  ITU data typically includes only the 
incumbent, and thus becomes less representative of the sector as a whole as the sector becomes 
more competitive.  In some ways the focus on the incumbent is beneficial to my analysis, and in 
some ways it is costly.  To the extent that I am interested in the effects of exclusivity on the 
incumbent, the data are appropriate.  But the new focus on wireless in developing countries 
means that the number of mainlines—traditionally the best measure of telephone penetration—
may no longer be a useful measure if new investment and competition is in other areas. 
Despite its problems, there is no good alternative to the ITU data.  I thus use several 
variables to measure investment.  I first use the number of mainlines as the dependent variable, 
consistent with most past work on telecom reforms.  As demonstrated below, however, when 
using this variable almost nothing in the regression is identified when controlling for fixed 
effects—not surprising since so much post-reform investment has focused on mobile services.  I 
therefore also estimate the equation using as the dependent variable the incumbent’s reported 
telecom investment, the number of payphones, the number of mobile subscribers, and the 
number of international outgoing minutes. 
The data on telecom investment by the incumbent may be the most useful indicator for 
testing the effects of exclusivity periods.  The variable typically measures only the incumbent’s 
investment.  This limitation is problematic when looking at total investment in the country, but in 
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this case it is actually beneficial: the incumbent was privatized and I wish to measure the effects 
of exclusivity on its investment. 
Other variables proxy for the incumbent’s investment and may prove useful.  Payphones, 
for example, are an important method of bringing telecommunications to poorer people in 
developing countries.  Competitive pressures may induce firms to increase investment in 
payphones; on the other hand, firms may be given exclusive telecom rights if they make a 
commitment to invest in the payphone network.  Competition, meanwhile, almost always comes 
from mobile telephone companies, and it is thus worth exploring the effects of exclusivity on the 
number of mobile subscribers.  The measure of mobile subscribers from the ITU typically 
excludes subscribers to new entrants—such data is enormously difficult to acquire—and thus this 
variable is another measure of the incumbent’s investment. 
Finally, as discussed above, many countries give the privatized firm exclusive use of the 
international gateway.  To explore the effects of this type of exclusivity I also use as a dependent 
variable the number of international outgoing minutes.  It is actually quite difficult to measure 
influences on international telecom traffic.  International settlement rates, as discussed above, 
differ between each country-pair and affect international calling prices, but are not publicly-
available.  In addition, the advent of “call-turnaround”—services that reverse the billing direction 
of a call so the consumer can pay the cheaper rate between the two countries—makes it difficult 
to know how much traffic actually originates in a country.  The number of international outgoing 
minutes is likely to be a quite noisy variable. 
 Introducing  the  exclusivity variable into the equation is complicated, and each approach 
has its own problems.  I use several definitions of exclusivity to determine how robust any 
conclusions are to the specification.  First I use a definition similar to that discussed above—
simply the log of the length of the exclusivity period.
8  This definition is acceptable for 
international exclusivity, since competition is nearly impossible without access to the 
international gateway.  The definition is problematic for fixed local service, however. 
The main problem is that legal exclusivity in fixed local provision does not necessarily 
mean that the firm actually is the monopoly provider.  In particular, the viability of mobile 
telephony as a strong competitor to fixed lines came as something of a shock to many 
governments and incumbent telephone firms.  Thus, many firms were given exclusivity periods 
                                                 
8   Actually, I define the variable as ln(number of years of exclusivity + 1) to deal with the zero problem.  
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in fixed, local provision, but not in mobile telephony.  Because mobile firms proved to be worthy 
competitors, exclusivity in fixed line often proved meaningless.  To deal with this issue I define a 
variable called “true exclusivity” which takes the value of one if the firm had an exclusivity 
period in fixed, local telephony AND faced no competition in mobile telephony. 
  Table 3 shows the results of estimating this equation for local exclusivity.  The first two 
columns show the results using the number of mainlines as the dependent variable without 
controlling for fixed effects.  Both true exclusivity and the log of the number of years of 
exclusivity are significantly negatively correlated with mainline growth.  However, none of the 
variables in the equation are identified when fixed effects are included.  This result should not 
come as a surprise.  Investing in the fixed line network in countries with poor existing service is 
rarely the focus after reforms.  Instead, mobile networks that can reach a much larger number of 
customers can be built for a fraction of the sunk costs, and this tends to be the focus in 
developing countries. 
  The next set of columns, therefore, uses the incumbent’s investment as the dependent 
variable.  The results on this variable are dramatic and robust.  Even controlling for country and 
year fixed effects, the coefficient on GDP per capita is positive and significant—wealthier 
countries see greater investment, ceteris peribus.  The coefficients on the exclusivity variables 
are large, and statistically significant, negative numbers.  True exclusivity is negative and 
significant, as is the log of the number of years of exclusivity.  An exclusivity period is 
negatively correlated with investment by the privatized telecom firm. 
  The remaining regressions yield qualitatively similar results.  Exclusivity is negatively 
correlated with growth in the number of mobile subscribers, which is not surprising since 
competition typically comes from mobile providers.  Exclusivity is also negatively correlated 
with growth in the number of payphones, which is disturbing since many firms with exclusivity 
rights pledge to build out the payphone network in exchange for monopoly rights.  Finally, 
international telecom traffic (as measured by international outgoing calls) is negatively 
correlated with exclusive provision of international services. 
In sum, these panel regressions highlight the cost of exclusivity periods.  Incumbents 
with guaranteed monopolies appear to invest far less than incumbents that were privatized and 
had to face competition.  Total investment by these firms was lower than firms that faced 
competition, as was mobile penetration, payphone growth, and international calling. 
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Together, the results of the two components confirm empirically what standard economic 
theory holds should be true.  A monopoly is more valuable to its owners than is a firm operating 
in a competitive environment.  Governments can significantly increase the sale proceeds of the 
telecom firm by guaranteeing its monopoly status.  However, this increased revenue to the 
treasury comes with a real cost.  Granting a monopoly concession seriously reduces investment 
by the privatized firm relative to firms that face competition.  Residents and businesses in the 
country not only lose out on the benefits of services provided by new entrants, but also suffer 
from reduced investment by the monopoly provider.  
 
5. Discussion 
Empirical studies of telecom reform often suffer from endogeneity problems.  Telecom 
reforms can cause changes in and result from the condition of the national telecom infrastructure, 
for example.  To some degree, this paper faces the same issue—granting an exclusivity period 
may be endogenous to network penetration.  In other words, countries that give exclusivity 
periods may do so because they have an especially poor telecom infrastructure and believe that 
monopoly concessions are needed to attract investors.  If this were true, we would find 
exclusivity periods negatively correlated with network expansion because poor networks cause 
exclusivity periods, not vice versa.  But if countries with poor networks were more likely to grant 
exclusivity periods, we would also expect to find a negative correlation between exclusivity 
periods and sales price when, in fact, the correlation is positive. 
While endogeneity may not be a problem of the same magnitude as in other empirical 
telecom studies, this paper is not without problems.  In particular, the dataset is still far from 
ideal.  First, its small, nonrandom, sample makes it difficult to generalize the results.  Second, it 
does not address the greatly varied regulatory environments across countries, which can 
significantly impact both the privatization transactions and network performance.  Finally, it 
does not adequately capture the many important details of the privatization transactions.  The 
solution to these problems is, of course, to gather more data.  This data-collection process is 
time-consuming and expensive, since it involves acquiring annual reports, prospectuses, and 
legislative and regulatory documents from a host of sources in each country.  Nonetheless, the 
provocative results in this paper only scratch the surface of what these data can tell us about a 
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host of topics.  The Infrastructure Privatization Database, when complete, promises to yield 
valuable new insights on a host of privatization topics crucial to developing countries. 
The Database will also ultimately help us answer many other questions about the 
privatization process.  What are the long-term effects of foreign ownership restrictions?  What 
are the effects of employee-ownership or of voucher privatization schemes?  How do regulatory 
institutions affect the development of the telecom sector?  These are especially important 
questions as countries continue to privatize telecom and other sectors and work on building 
nascent regulatory agencies. 
 
6. Conclusions 
•  Telecommunications reforms around the world—and in developing countries in 
particular—have brought telecom service to literally millions of people, and improved 
service to many others.  Research to date has largely demonstrated that competition and 
privatization under the right institutional environment can lead to substantial performance 
improvements.  The empirical literature, however, has almost completely ignored the 
details of the privatization process.  These details can make an enormous difference.  In 
particular, governments tend to give the newly privatized firm a monopoly concession on 
telecom service.  While some contend that an exclusivity period is necessary to 
encourage investment, the only reasonable explanation is to increase the government’s 
revenues from the sale. 
•  The government may face intense pressure to maximize the sale price.  But turning a 
public monopoly into a private monopoly may not necessarily generate the improvements 
reformers envision.  Guaranteeing the newly-privatized firm a monopoly can increase the 
government’s windfall from the sale, but may limit the improvements that reforms could 
bring.  The point of this paper is to quantify the implications of that choice.  I find 
evidence that exclusivity periods can double the firm’s sale price, but at the cost of 
substantially reducing investment. 
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Argentina TASA (south) 1990 2834 60 10 10 1,695,504 4,723 2,786
Argentina Telecom Argentina (north) 1990 2408 60 10 10 1,401,969 4,013 2,863
Barbados Cable & Wireless BARTEL 1991 3 11 . 0 77,977 27 350
Bolivia ENTEL 1995 610 50 0 6 246,881 1,220 4,942
Brazil Embratel 1998 2370 19.26 0 0 17,932,814 12,305 686
Brazil Telesp 1998 5160 19.26 0 0 6,377,677 26,791 4,201
Brazil Telecentro-Sul 1998 1850 19.26 0 0 3,757,261 9,605 2,556
Brazil Telenorte-Leste 1998 3070 19.26 0 0 7,797,876 15,940 2,044
Chile CTC 1988 99.5 30 0 0 591,565 332 561
Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire Telecom 1997 210 51 7 7 143,800 412 2,863
Czech Republic SPT Telecom 1995 1450 27 0 5 2,444,156 5,370 2,197
El Salvador Compania de Telecomunicaciones (CTE) 1998 275 51 0 0 396,402 539 1,360
El Salvador Internacional de Telecomunicaciones (INTEL) 1998 41 51 0 0 396,402 80 203
Ghana Ghana Telecom 1996 38 30 6 6 77,886 127 1,626
Guatemala Telecomunicaciones de Guatemala (TELGUA) 1998 700 95 0 0 517,000 737 1,425
Guinea SOTELGUI 1995 45 60 10 10 10,900 75 6,881
Guyana Guyana Telephone and Telegraph Ltd. (GT&T) 1991 16.5 80 20 20 16,000 21 1,289
Hungary MATAV (Magyar Tavkozlesi Vallalat) 1993 875 30.29 8 8 1,466,946 2,889 1,969
Jamaica Jamaica Telephone Company (JTC) 1987 155.8 79 25 25 81,700 197 2,414
Mexico TelMex 1990 1757.6 20.4 0 6 5,354,500 8,616 1,609
Mongolia Mongolia Telecoms 1995 4.5 40 3 0 77,745 11 145
Peru Telefonica del Peru 1994 2002 35 4 4 772,390 5,720 7,406
Poland Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (TP) 2000 4300 35 0 3 . 12,286 .
South Africa Telkom, SA 1997 1260 30 5 5 4,650,000 4,200 903
Tanzania Tanzania Telecommunications Company Limited (TTC 2000 120 35 4 4 163,000 343 2,103
Trinidad & Tobago Trinidad & Tobago Telephone Company 1989 85 49 20 20 165,000 173 1,051
Uganda Uganda Telecom Ltd. (UTL) 2000 33.5 51 5 5 57,239 66 1,148
Venezuela CANTV 1991 1885 51 9 9 1,598,947 3,696 2,312
Senegal SONATEL 1997 106.6 33 7 7 95,100 323 3,397
Jordan Jordan Telecommunication Corporation 2000 508 40 5 5 565,000 1,270 2,248
Panama INTEL / Cable & Wireless Panama 1997 652 49 5 5 366,000 1,331 3,636














Exclusivity and Firm Sales Price
ln(implied firm value) ln(implied value per line)
Any exclusivity 1.05 1.162
(2.86)** (3.15)**
Any international exclusivity 1.178 1.247
(4.41)** (4.60)**
ln(years of local exclusivity) 0.254 0.355
(1.40) (2.24)*
ln(years of international exclusivity) 0.48 0.517
(3.78)** (4.18)**
ln(population) 0.558 0.477 0.452 0.468 0.327 0.271 0.288 0.305
(3.15)** (3.04)** (2.26)* (2.80)* (3.34)** (3.08)** (2.09)* (3.27)**
ln(gdp per capita) 0.522 0.5 0.498 0.367 0.173 0.184 0.159 0.11
(1.95)+ (2.08)* (1.43) (1.42) (1.17) (1.37) (0.91) (0.8)
ln(international settlement payments per line) 0.283 0.226 0.221 0.176
(2.33)* (2.18)* (1.73)+ (1.62)
ln(international settlement payments) 0.196 0.155 0.146 0.121
(1.5) (1.4) (1.02) (1.03)
ln(number of mainlines) -0.558 -0.475 -0.477 -0.38
(2.62)* (2.53)* (1.83)+ (1.85)+
Constant -16.133 -15.081 -14.002 -14.517 -14.863 -13.84 -13.526 -13.565
(6.29)** (7.25)** (5.10)** (6.61)** (5.96)** (7.00)** (4.96)** (6.60)**
Observations 32 30 29 30 32 30 29 30
R-squared 0.41 0.58 0.3 0.53 0.36 0.54 0.27 0.5
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 3
Exclusivity and Investment






country & year 
fixed effects
country and year fixed effects 
included
country and year fixed 
effects included
country and year fixed effects 
included
country and year fixed 
effects included
True exclusivity -0.238 -0.092 0.002 -1.121 -1.142 -0.41 -0.389 -0.282 -0.249
(1.63) (1.30) (0.04) (5.36)** (5.24)** (2.08)* (2.38)* (2.75)** (2.36)*
ln(years exclusivity + 1) -0.176 -0.019 -0.248 -0.224 -0.273 -0.244 -0.113 -0.122
(2.98)** (0.35) (1.90)+ (1.94)+ (3.43)** (3.06)** (2.42)* (2.74)**
ln(years international exclusivity + 1) -0.095
(1.80)+
ln(gdp per capita) 1.009 1.03 1.076 0.166 0.098 2.091 2.207 2.138 0.031 0.833 0.163 -0.982 -0.322 -0.899 1.576
(19.80)** (18.16)** (4.61)** -0.81 (0.46) (2.99)** (2.78)** (2.93)** -0.04 -0.93 -0.22 (2.43)* -0.78 (2.16)* (5.76)**
ln(population) 0.814 0.719 5.602 1.081 0.053 1.926 1.289 1.469 0.317 4.262 1.455 4.823 6.567 4.907 4.945
(21.79)** (14.90)** (10.85)** (1.68)+ (0.07) -0.87 -0.47 -0.57 -0.15 -1.63 -0.62 (3.67)** (4.60)** (3.31)** (6.26)**
Constant -7.159 -5.603 -84.926 -6.23 11.131 -27.787 -19.515 -21.674 3.148 -67.449 -16.367 -60.979 -95.98 -64.299 -74.45
(9.93)** (6.25)** (11.42)** (0.60) (0.93) -0.77 -0.43 -0.51 -0.09 -1.53 -0.41 (2.82)** (4.06)** (2.58)* (5.66)**
Observations 178 163 178 178 163 128 117 114 160 169 156 154 144 141 170
Number of countries 27 27 25 22 20 20 27 29 27 28 26 26 28
R-squared 0.89 0.88 0.7 0.84 0.85 0.53 0.43 0.56 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.67 0.7 0.69 0.83
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
True exclusivity = exclusivity period in effect & no mobile or fixed competitors